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In the immediate aftermath of the South African War, the Bri-
tish divided the Transvaal into five regions for the purposes of
"native administration". Each of these regions was commanded by a
native commissioner (NC) . They were stationed in the following dis-
trits: Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg and Waterburg
and were responsible for the northern, eastern, central and southern
western, and north-western zones of the colony respectively. Thus,
for example, the Lydenburg NC was responsible for the Eastern Trans-
vaal generally (including such districts as Barberton, Carolina,
Ermelo, Middelburg, Piet Retief and Wakkerstroom as well as Lyden-
burg itself).This point needs to be laboured for when, in the text,
the NC of a particular district is cited referring to affairs within
it, he will often be referring to the entire region under his co-
mmand and not merely to the district by which he is designated. ;"
Swaziland, which does not enter this study, was disannexed from
the Transvaal in "J906.
This map has been amended from the Transvaal Agricultural Jou-
rnal, Vol. VII, JU!Y_1909,. _ N O ^ 2 by. Eliza Kentridge.
1. War and Class Struggle
The connection between war and class struggle, whilst complex and
often circuitous, is close. The patriotic fervour unleashed by wars
between nations can, and is often intended to, defuse class conflict
at home. In his autobiography, Trotsky, writing of the "patriotic en-
thusiasm" engendered in the "masses in Austria-Hungary" by the "decla-
ration of war in 1914, attempted to explain the phenomenon: "Aust-
ria-Hungary was the very negation of any national idea", yet the Vi-
ennese crowd - composed of many nationalities and classes - display-
ed a sense of unity and excitement. For Trotsky, the "moving force"
of this phenomenon was the "alarm of mobi1isation" breaking the "mo-
notony of hopelessness" in the lives of the oppressed:
I strode along the main streets of the familiar Vi-
enna and watched a most amazing crowd fill the fash-
ionable Ring, a crowd in which hopes had been awaken-
ed. 3ut wasn't a small part of those hopes already
being realised? Would it have been possible at any oth-
er time for porters, laundresses, shoemakers, apprent-
ices. ..to feel themselves masters of the situation in
nhe Ring? War affects everybody, and those who are opp-
ressed. ..feel that they are on an equal footing with
the rich and powerful.
Ir» class society, social hatred and the desire for equality may be
sublimated in the overwhelming emotions of patriotism. Trotsky him-
self noticed the "paradox" that "in the moods of the Viennese crowd
that was demonstrating the glory of...Hapsburg arms" he "detected
something familiar" from the days of the 1905 Revolution in Petro-
grad: "No wonder that in history war has often been the mother of
revolution."
During times of war, the ruling culture of a state embraces
those whom, in 'normal times' it despises. The sense of self-worth
of the "porter, laundress, shoemaker" and others rises as their ru-
lers proclaim their centrality to the defence of the realm. Ranks
close. A sense of community grows U P amidst the classes and is main-
tained - provided the war is victorious.
When defeat ensues, the sense of community created by the fu-
tile adventure dissolves and that which has been sublimated in it
may cathartically be released. In the oppressed an acute conscious-- .
ness of their real position in society arises; this combines with
the discrediting of the class responsible for the ruinous conflict -
and a period of revolutionary upheaval may follow. The Franco-Pruss-
ian War, which engendered in France the general jauntiness and pat-
riotism described in the early chapters of Zola's The Debacle, end-
ed in the catastrophic defeat of the French armies and the rise of
utve Paris Commune, the first attempt at a socialist revolution in
history. The 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, embarked upon by the Czarist
regime quite self-consciously and unashamedly to prevent a revolu-
tion, helped spawn the Soviets and the general class storm of 1905-7.
The Great War, too, patriotically-welcomed in Russia and effectively
shunting its revolutionary movement to the sidings of its national
life, ultimately led to a "terrorised" new consciousness rising "in
the deep recesses of the masses, in the trenches and so on" which
helped lay the objective conditions for October.
War, of course. does not necessarily lead to such revolutionary
denouements. 3ui the relationship between the class struggle in part-
icular societies and external mi1itary interventions into them can
be direct and even decisive. The ancient world provides some i1lumi-
nating examples of this. The refusal of significant sections of the
peasantry of the Roman Empire to rally tc its defence, when barbarian
invaders crossed its frontiers and initiated its final demise, has
recently been advanced as an important factor in the Empire's fall.
The most recent and exhaustive study of class structure and struggle
ir. ancier.t Greece and Rome - de Ste. Croix's - links this fact di-
ectly to the alienation of the Empire's peasants, "the merciless ex-
ploitation" of whom "made many of them receive...at least with in-
difference, the...invaders who might..-be expected...no shatter the
oppressive imperial financial machine." The slaves of Antiquity,
moreover, sometimes took advantage of war-time conditions to desert
their masters en masse, the most famous example of this being the
f1lght of more than 20 000 slaves from their Attican masters when
Sparta invaded Decelea in the fifth century B.C.
"or the exploited classes in certain societies, then, the arr-
ival of foreign forces can be the signal for revolt or general resist-
ance. When the mould of everyday-1 ife is shattered, when the existing
rule of a class is threatened and when 'the balance of class forces'
is thrown into sudden disequilibrium, the alienation and resistance
of the oppressed - usually swaddled in paternalism, regulated by com-
promise and countered by direct coercion - may find an outlet which
allows for a freer and more direct expression of the basic antagon-
ism between the classes.
This study examines the sudden shift in the rural class struggle
attendant upon the arrival of the British Army in the Transvaal dur-
ing the South African, or Boer, War of 1899-1902; its foci are the
war itself and (especially) its immediate aftermath, when the task
of restoring landlord authority was undertaken by the new British
Administration of the Transvaal. For the Boer War had been an imper-
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"ialist war against a class of landowners. In fact, of all the guerr-
illa wars of the twentieth century, the Boer War is unique in that
its guerrillas were rooted, not in a peasantry, but in an agrarian
ruling class: the Boer Army whilst composed partly of Afrikaner ten-
ant farmers, was commanded by landowners and a sizeable proportion
of its rank and file were landlords as well. During the war, the
3ritish strategy came increasingly to concentrate upon destroying
this class. The ferocious destruction and looting of Beer farms,
livestock, crops and property; and the herding - there is no other
word - of the landlord's families into concentration camps constit-
uted an effective expropriation of the rural ruling class whose re-
sources and command lay at the heart of the Boers ' war effort.
This massive and decisive intervention into the world of the
landowners, however, was an intervention into a world already riven
with conflicts and antagonisms. These became transformed into things
of a different order entirely. Rural workers were now afforded oppor-
tunities to participate in the destruction of their exploiters and to
prevent their return. The Boer War, then, allowed the class struggle
on the agrarian estate to emerge from its subterranean stream - where
the cross-currents of master-servant relations eddied in theft, des-
ertion, "laziness" and "insolence" - and to run an overt and vigo-
rous course to the field of open combat against the landlords.
2. The Rural Underclasses
Before commencing the analysis, a note of clarification is necessary.
The principal dramatis personae of this study are black rural pro-
ducers residing on Boer farms and on communal lands at the turn of
the century in the Transvaal. Dispossessed, to a greater or lesser
degree, by Boer colonists throughout the nineteenth century, and
subjected to the rule of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek CZAR) - the
nineteenth century Boer State in the Transvaal - these two distinct
groupings often formed part of a larger community which owed alleg-
iance to a single authority within the peasant world.
Most workers on Boer farms were tenants of various kinds, some
were virtually slaves and a few were proletarians proper. On commun'-r
al lands, black peasants lived in relatively independent communities.
This relative independence, however, should not be taken to imply a
freedom from exploitation. The social structure of the peasant vill-
age, analysed obliquely and intermittently in this study, ensured
that.such exploitation existed within the peasant community itself -
although it was held within certain limits.
Moreover, hemmed in by the massive and increasing encroachments
of private property, peasants on communal lands found themselves the
victims of exploitation external to the villages in which they liv-
ed . Increasing numbers of young men were forced into spel Is of mig-
rant labour on mines or farms by the need to meet the fiscal exac-
tions of the state, the subsistence and security retirements of
peasantries whose economies had already been punctured by massive
expropriations of communal land and, finally, by the need to pay
tribute to the leading men in their communities. Blacks on comm-
unal lands were also subjected to the predatory activities of the
ZAR state's functionaries - native commissioners and veldkornets,
both in practice little more than representatives of the prominent
Beer landowners in a particular district. These officials, whose
briefs included the collection of taxes and the settlement of dis-
putes between landlords and tenants, widely extended their activities
so that, at tines, they came to personify the process of .primitive
accumulation, looting a significant portion of the resources remain-
ing to peasants. The seizure of captives and booty in wars against
black rural communities, the imposition of forced labour and ' tax
raids' which took the form cf massive exercises in armed robbery
formed part of their contribution to the pre-history of capitalism
6in South Arrica.
It is these two groupings, then - black peasants on communal land
and black labourers (of various kinds) on Boer farms - whose struggles
are delineated in this study. General references to the "rural under-
classes" or "agrarian workers" and affinal terms designate them coll-
ectively . The term "workers" indicates not simply proletarians, of
whom there were very few on Transvaal farms at this time, nor mere-
ly labourers on farms but the primary producers of the rural world
generally.
The one significant section of the rural underclasses excluded
from this study is the Afrikaner rural poor. At first sight this
may appear paradoxical since their war-time experience serves to
il lust rate some of the contentions made earl ier -in regard to the
relationship of war to class struggle. Even before the Boer War,
some Afrikaner tenants complained that they, the propertiless, were
forced - and without remuneration - to protect mi 1 itari ly the prop-
erty of others. And there were landlords who had to force their Afri-
kaner tenants into Boer military service during the war. The Boer
forces began to disintegrate when their string of early victories
snapped at Paardeburg where, in February 1900, they suffered their
first major defeat. Within four months of this, the major Boer cities
fell to the British. Once defeat was certain, a haemorrhage of de-
serters from the Boer cause began which no disciplinary tourneauet
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could stem: by July 1900, more than a quarter of all those liable
for military service in the Boer Republics had laid down their arms .
Still more worrying for the Boer commanders was the growing number
of deserters prepared to turn their guns against their former com-
rades-in-arms. By the end of the war, in fact, the number of Boers
in the service of the British military was equivalent in numbers
to almost one third of the Boer Army still in the field. Aware of
the local terrain and the way their former units were 1 ikely to use
it, these deserters contributed to the Boer defeat in no negligible
way - a fact emphasised by the Boer generals themselves. Significant-
ly, the great majority of those who deserted the Boer cause and en-
listed with the British - and there were thousands of these - were
tenants and proletarians. Such people appear to have succumbed easily
to British promises of land and post-war privileges: many of them
were enlisted in units whose task it was to round up Boer cattle -
the "looting corps" as they became known - and a percentage Of this
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loot they were allowed to retain.
The complex skein of the class struggle between Afrikaner land-
lord and tenant and its refraction through the Boer War itself, how-
ever, will have to be unravelled elsewhere. A comprehensive explor-
ation of it here might break the analytical unity of this study,
which - is concerned with the struggles of colonially-dispossessed
working people. The Afrikaner rural poor, oppressed and exploited
though they were, were part of a colonizing people. This fact nec-
essitates addressing a series of questions which are not germane
to the historical experience, of the vast bulk of the people consi-
dered here. How, for example, did a common ethnic and political
culture undermine the effectiveness of the class struggle fought
by Afrikaner tenants and proletarians against their Afrikaner ex-
ploiters? How did 'hegemonic mechanisms' , for example the Dutch Re-
formed Church, which ministered to both landlord and tenant, blunt
the cutting edge of that struggle? Above all, how did the racism of
Afrikaner workers and the presence below them of still more oppress-
ed black workers, sometimes held in virtual bondage, distort and
limit their struggles? "Labour in a white skin", wrote Marx, "cannot
emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin."
3. Selling Out the Ruling Class
Agrarian workers availed themselves constantly of the opportunities
provided them to settle accounts with their exploiters by providing
intelligence to the British Army. Their role in this - and in scout-
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\n<3 for the imperial army - and the importance of these for the Boer
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defeat, are now well-established. Workers spied and informed upon
employers aiding the Boer cause and even planted incriminating evi-
dence upon them. The treason courts, at which tenants and servants
betrayed their landlords and masters, "mediated", writes Nasson. "a
form of agrarian class conf I ict" "provoked" by "war conditions" .
Such activities were carried on on a scale sufficient to engender a
general fear in those Afrikaner farming families sympathetic to the
3oer fcrces and sometimes spawned a savage cycle of discipline and
reprisal. The rural world was enveloped in a "sullen atmosphere of
hatred and vengeance" which found its macabre carnival in the brawl-
ing which broke out between farm workers and relatives of the acc-
used , in the burnings in effigy of Boer leaders by black workers,
in the feting of firing squads and in the crowds of peasants and
workers who cheered on the publIC executions of Boers. The central-
ity of class antagonisms to these events was recognised by the im-
perial army itself, one of whose officers described this particular
historical process as one in which workers were "Doing down their
Masters", and one of whose journals commented that: "Xlembooi, Gent-
leman, Sixpence, February, or whatever his name is...seems cjuite
intent on getting rid of his master".
A glimpse of the rapidity with which farm workers in the Trans-
vaal grasped the opportunities to engage in intelligence work aga-
inst the army of their landlords is provided by a community of ten-
ants scattered across Boer farms in the Lichtenburg District. Acc-
ording to one of its representatives, Jantjie Mosiaan:
On the outbreak of...war we seized every opportunity
which offered to render the British troops all poss-
ible assistance, and generally identified ourselves
with the British Cause as against that of the Boers.
Enrolling themselves as "Scouts and secret agents" with the British,
and with some of these tenants "purposely" entering "the service of
the"Boer commandants", they kept imperial intelligence officers
"well posted in the information they sought". The colonial adminis-
trator who initially registered a cynical scepticism as to these
claims should have been convinced by the detailed information pro-
vided by Mosiaan as to where, and for which commander, these serv- .-
ices were rendered and which British official could now corroborate
them. The most cogent proof of the role performed by these tenants
lay elsewhere, however - in the actions of their landlords. For the
general eviction of these tenants by Boer landlords after the war -
attributed by the tenants themselves to their collaboration with the
British - suggests that, whatever the scepticism of the administra-
tor concerned, the agrarian ruling class was convinced of the ver-
acity of Mosiaan's story and knew its significance for the rural
order at whose apex that class stood. The organic link between
Afrikaner landlords and the Boer Army pre-determined a link bet-
ween the tenantry's intelligence work for the British and its vio-
lation of the social relations of the Boer farm.
4. "The Frankenstein Monster T Armed Blacks Against the Boers
Rural workers of various kinds, however, were able to engage in more
dramatic activities against Boer forces than intelligence and logist-
ical work for the British: it is estimated that between ten and thir-
ty thousand armed blacks served with the imperial forces, and they
were involved in such crucial operations as guarding blockhouses
and the lines between them. Perhaps even more significant than this
was ~he role played by armed peasants and farm workers, often nor en -
rolled by the British in cutting off swarthes of territory, and their
resources, from the Boer forces, thereby enabling the British Army to
concentrate its fire whilst the noose of the blockhouses tightened
around the commandos. Hundreds of square miles of the Boer states
were "effectively closed to commando penetration" in this way, whi le
attempts were sometimes made to cut off escape and supply routes in
adjacent territories as wel 1 . In the north-western Transvaal, peas-
ant communities made it gravely difficult for Boer commandos to ob-
tain food; Kgatla peasants and tenants seized control of significant
zones of the western Transvaal and shut them off from Boer guerrillas
rural blacks led by Malekuti prevented Boer incursions into the Midd-
elburg District, • north of the Blood River - their exploits included
an armed engagement in which they captured .over thirty Boers; peas-
ants led by Micha Dinkwanyane, meanwhile', closed off the strategic- •
ally-vital Waterval valley to the Boers, whilst - in t'he eastern
Transvaal - the Pedi cut their heartland out of the Boer area of op-
erations. Historians have only recently realised the central ity of
such actions to the Boer defeat although it was discerned clearly
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enough by contemporary military commanders on both sides.
Direct attacks upon Boer commandos and laagers by armed p e a s -
ants, whilst never decisive in themselves, were responsible for the
harrying of Boer soldiers and the triggering of social fears which
made them anxious for their families. Whilst such attacks were fairly
general across the war zones and often resulted in fatalities, two
were of salient importance: the Kgatla attack upon the Boer encamp-
ment at Derdepoort in the Transvaal in November 1899, which engender-
ed widespread fear in the Rustenburg Afrikaner farming community and
d to the recalling of all burghers in the district for service at
Derdepoort; and the Zulu attack upon a Boer camp at Holkrans (until
the British annexation of the Transvaal, part of the ZAR) which ann-
ihilated the commando stationed there and was sufficiently terrify-
ing to Boer society at large for it to be used by General Botha as
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one of the reasons ror a general surrender.
Attacks upon Boer forces by agrarian workers were sometimes un-
dertaken independently of British command and must be located with-
in the general class struggles attendant upon the colonial disposs-
lon of a peasantry and the subjection of much of it in relationships
of tenancy or, indeed, virtual slavery. The essential lines of conn-
ection may be followed in a sketch of the Ndebele peasantry from the
1880s to the Boer War itself. In the early-i880s, their heartland
was conquered by Boer forces and parcelled out to the Afrikaner sol-
diery-who participated in the campaign against it. Thus dispossess-
ed , the peasantry itself was scattered across farms in the central
and eastern Transvaal as "labourers and apprentices" in conditions
"little short of slavery". Taking advantage of war-time conditions
and "the absence of their landlords", "a very large number" of these
people - "at least 300 kraals" - streamed back to the Middelburg
District from which they had originally been dispersed. There they
settled upon "ground" which ha.<i since become "private" and reconstit-
uted their communal existence. Given their experience, it was perhaps
inevitable that these people would take an "active part" in the war ag
against the Boer commandos with whom they engaged in open combat on
at least three occasions. For such people the war against the
Boer Army must have been associated indissolubly, with an escape
from bondage and the restitution of a world of which they had been
dispossessed.
5.Agrarian Workers and the Expropriation of the,Boer Landlord Class
Perhaps the most significant proof of the coalescence of class con-
flict and military operations against the Boers lies in the part
played by the rural underclasses in the general expropriation of Boer
Landlords undertaken by the British Army. Rural blacks played an im-"
portant role in the destruction and looting of farmsteads and crops
and in bringing into the concentration camps families removed from
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Boer farms. It was, however, in the seizure of livestock from land-
owners and in the occupation of their ground that rural workers
played their most dramatic role.
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t. The expropriation of livestock
Livestock, fundamental to the sustenance of the farming families and
the Boer Army in the field, as well as its mobility, was raided and
looted on a massive scale by peasants and tenants. The importance
of mobilising rural blacks into an assault on this basic element of
Boer property was recognised by the British military and soon came to
1 8have a place in the imperial war strategy. Kgatla peasants were
encouraged1 to plunder Boer cat t le and promised 25%, perhaps 30%, of
the booty; Zulu cattle-raiders were formally organised under Colonel
Bottomley and promised 10% of the livestock they seized, much of i t
from Transvaal Boers; by arrangement with General Walter Kitchener,
Pedi peasants led by Sekhukhune, Mpisane and Malekutu, guarded Boer
cattle driven into their strongholds by the British in return for
19
at least 50% of this animate chattel.
The scale of cattle-raiding inciied by the British was, how-
ever, very much greater than these more well-known instances suggest.
In the Western Transvaal, for example, Gopane Sebogodi - leader cf a
community of over 2 000 peasants - was instructed "to loot everything"
that could be looted from Marico Boers "carrying arms against the Bri-
tish'* and given undertakings that all livestock so seized would be-
come his property. When, after the war, Sebogodi attempted tc prevent
the return, to their original owners, of those animals his people had
seized from Boer combatants, the Commissioner of Native Affairs him-
self drew attention to the fact that the difficulties of this part-
icular case arose from a general British strategy:
This is only a type of many cases now arising ;L!1
over the Transvaal in which natives acting under the
verbal or written authority cf Military Officers eith-
er seized or were given cattle and the owners are now
marching about demanding them.(20)
Indeed, one senior British official admitted that "sometimes leave"
was "given to natives to keep all...Boer cattle they could capture."
Touring the Central Transvaal after the war, one functionary
found "many farmers" complaining of losses of stock "alleged to be
looted by Natives" and drew attention to those cases "where the Mil-
itary Commandants...ordered Native Chiefs, to collect Boer cat t le into
British Camps and...paid them with some of these cat t le for their la-
bour". In the wake of ttie war, in the northern reaches of the Middel-
burg District, and on payment of a small fee, peasants were prepared
to return Boer "furniture and carriages" in their possession. "Stock
and wagons*1, however, they regarded "on a different footing; these
they were specially instructed by the military authorities to take
from the Boers." In the Northern Transvaal, peasants were employed by
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such authorities "to collect Boer stock" and in the eastern Transvaal,
"some of the native Chiefs" actually "held written orders from the
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Military...to take all cattle belonging to the Boer".
Peasants and tenants, however, did not merely act under imper-
ial instruction in their expropriation of Boer cattle. The Kgat-
la, scourge of the western Transvaal, who on occasion could sack
their way through Boer farms from the Bechuanaland border to the
very district of Pretoria, provide clear evidence of this: they
were described as having "committed extensive looting of stoc1/....
from the Boers during the war, for most of which", according to one
official, "they had no authority." Zulu peasants engaged in such ex-
tensive raids upon Boer cattle in the south-eastern Transvaal on the-
ir own volition that British officials, fearful of the post-war re-
sults of such lawlessness, sought to put a brake upon their actions,
if necessary by deploying troops against them. In the northern Trans-
vaal, there were "hundreds" of "claims by Boers" against peasants
"for cattle and furniture etc. taken during the war." The local na-
tive commissioner (NC) had evidently set himself the post-war task
of forcing blacks to surrender such property as they "could not shew
authority for having, and what the Boer could prove was his." ^
There was a final way in which agrarian working people attemp-
ted to possess the cattle of those whom one historian designates the
"landlords in arms". For, at the onset of hostilities, many Boers
deposited their livestock with blacks (presumably tenants) for safe-
keeping : their temporary custodians, however, sought to appropriate
such livestock. The Secretary of Native Affairs, in fact, was to ob-
serve upon the phenomenon; and when one adds to this evidence - from
the western Transvaal and the northern Middelburg District - of pea-
sants attempting to retain livestock entrusted to them by Boers, one
realises the scale on which this must have occurred.
Whether expropriated under imperial instruction, looted under in-
dependent initiative or confiscated under cover of custodianship, the
peasantry came to control vast numbers of the livestock of the land-
owning class during the war. Still more archival evidence could be
cited of the "many cases" of Boer cattle in peasant hands in the Tra-
nsvaal . The most striking proof of the scale of stock-seizure from
Transvaal Boers, however, -was to lie - in a sense - beyond the bor-
ders of the territory. The Kgatla and Zulu peasantries' more inde-
pendent heartlands lay, respectively, in Bechuanaland and Zululand
but numbers of both lived as tenants on farms in contiguous areas
of the Transvaal . Arriving as organised raiders from beyond the Tra-
nsvaal, Kgatla and Zulu parties could be reinforced by the local ten-
..antry, who would be excellently-placed to provide intelligence as to
locale and livestock, and then retreat with their booty and store it
far from its original source. It is estimated that at least 10 000
cattle and a few thousand sheep were raided and rustled out of the
Transvaal and into Zululand during the Boer War. The Kgatla case is
even more striking. In 1904, their reserve alone held over 16 000
cattle, more than ten times its pre-war number. For some years af-
ter the war, cattle were so plentiful that beasts were slaughtered
every night for feasting at the Kgatla's principal settlement, Moch-
udi. So widespread had their raiding of Boer cattle been that the
Kgatla were able to eradicate utterly the effects of the Rinderpest
which, before the war, had'decimated their herds. The extent of this
expropriation found a symbol in Bovine breeds: the tall, spindly cow
of the pre-war Kgatla seems to have mutated into a thicker, shorter-
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horned animal akin to the Afrikander. .
ii. Agrarian workers and the expropriation of Boer land
Clearly, the most crucial resource for rural people, and the one upon
which all agrarian production depended, was land. Control of it be-
fore the South African War defined Boer landowners as a ruling class.
Consequently, an effective expropriation of that class could not be
carried through by the underclasses unless they executed a success-
assault upn Boer property rights in land: For if they failed to fill
the vacuum left by the British (and their own) removal of landlords
from Boer farms, and if they failed to prevent the return of the land-
owning class and keep possession of its land, then - ultimately - wor-
king people would not put a decisive stamp upon the kind of rural soc-
iety which was to arise in the Transvaal after the Boer War. To what
degree, then, did rural blacks seize control of Boer land during the
war and subvert it to their own purposes? And to what extent did they
maintain that control after the war?
The Kgatla tenantry in the Western Transvaal, strongly reinforc-
ed by regiments from Bechuanaland, occupied the farms of their land-
lords (particularly- in the Pilansberg area), part of the process which
Warwick calls "the tenants' revolt in the-western Transvaal". So wide-
ranging was this revolt, that when General Smuts entered the region of
the western Transvaal "whose tenantry was Kgatla, he found that almost
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every farm was deserted by its owner. And when those owners sought
to return to their farms after the war, they found them occupied by
the Kgatla - a discovery which engendered in the landlords a "general
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state of terror". A similar process was to be observed in the south-
eastern Transvaal (the area known as the new Republic, which, the Bri-
tish were to annex to Natal). There, too, many Zulu tenants - rein-
forced by their armed kinspeople from Zululand - came to occupy the
farms of their landlords and bring them under cultivation. In fact, •
according to one historian, similar events occurred throughout "areas
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of the northern and western Transvaal". From the former region, it
was reported that with "many" of the farmers "away...the Natives...
thinking the Boers would not again return, moved their kraals and gar-
,.3 2dens on to private farms." In fact, the geographical sweep of the
occupation of Boer private property was to be far greater than this,
comprehending the central, eastern and southern zones of the colony
as well. From the Northern Middelburg District, for example, "a good
deal of friction" was reported between the returning farmer and the
local peasant, "the latter having ploughed lands of the former, dur-
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ing his absence, and in some instances... settled on the farms." Acc-
ording to the NC responsible for the eastern'.Transvaal, the culti-
vation of landlord's estates by peasants and tenants had "been done
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all over the country"; meanwhile, the NC in charge of the Pretoria
and Heidelburg Districts noted the movement of "many Natives on to
various picked farms" which they hoped to retain access to after the
35
war.
iii. The consciousness of expropriation
Only in exceptional instances did the process of expropriation and
occupation delineated above take the form of revolutionary struggle:
in the Pilansberg, there is little doubt that Kgatla tenants viewed
their actions as part of an offensive to lig^iidate the landlords for
all time and regain the land of which they had been dispossessed. But
it is important to note that, where occupations of Boer land occurred
in other areas, those who subverted the land to their own purposes
did not simply view this as a temporary enjoyment of a resource during
an interregnum in which the rule of the rural ruling class was suspen-
ded. They beiieved that their appropriations (or, more correctly, the-
ir .reappropriations) of land would be permanent.
The western Transvaal, the area in which the effects of the ex-
propriations were to be most marked, is a convenient starting-point
for an analysis of the evidence. Some months after the war had ended,
the sub-NC of its Pilansberg region noted the "disappointment" of
the Kgatla "that all...Boer farms in the Pilansberg", which they
looked upon "as theirs by right of conquest", were "to be given back
to the boers." "Having to leave the farms which a great many of them"
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had "begun to occupy, during the absence of the Boers", was held to
be one of their principal "grievances". To prevent the return of their
landlords, in fact, these peasants had militant intentions: they drew
a line at the Elands River and planned to prevent Boers from crossing
36it. From the north-western Transvaal, too, comes clear evidence that
the underclasses believed landlords to have been expropriated. There,
in the aftermath of the war, it was reported that blacks were "full of
astonishment that the Boers" were "allowed to retain their farms" and
tenants were described as expecting "a very good time by retaining"
their holdings on such farms "for no rent". It was said that, in this
region, the tenantry "generally thought" Boer farms were to be divi-
ded amongst it by the imperial administration. In the northern
Transvaal, a similar consciousness can be discerned: from both Haener-
tsburg and Spelonken, Africans were described as perplexed by the Bri-
tish policy of allowing Boers "to return, to" or "continue on their
' farms". Military operations in the region- wrote one administrator,
appeared to have given "the Native" the "mistaken idea that when the
Boer was...captured [,3 sent away and his farmstead destroyed... the
land would revert to the original native occupiers"; consequently, the
latter "promptly went back to it." Indeed, blacks in the northern Tran-
svaal were reported to have "emerged from the war...with the idea
that" its "object. . '.had been to return them to their old lands, and
that white owners had been expelled forever from their farms and ha-
bitations ."
In the eastern Transvaal, in his "travels around the country", the
NC discovered a "general" belief amongst farm workers that the defeat
of the Boers had led to their expropriation; and, in the northern Mid-
delburg region - also under his jurisdiction - the same "idea" seems
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"to have got among" the peasantry. In the south-eastern Transvaal
(i.e. the zone ceded to Natal), the Zulu tenantry believed thatfarms
(which constituted land of which they had been dispossessed) would re-
vert to their original Zulu owners, the Beer landlords being perman-
expropriated. The central and southern zones of the Transvaal also
provide evidence of this 'consciousness of expropriation'. The NC res-
ponsible for these areas observed that "the policy of the British Gov-
ernment in allowing the Boers to retain and return to their farms"
"appears to surprise the Natives" - "in some cases" they conveyed "al-
most indignation" at it. They "did not expect" such a policy and had,
in fact, anticipated "that the British Government would expropriate
the farms and distribute them on payment". Conseciuently many of them
had "moved on to various picked farms...hoping to claim prior consid-
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eration in case of redistribution."
The scale of the general belief of rural working people in the ex-
propriation of the Boer landowning class, however, is conveyed bet-
ter in the general observations of high officials and politicians than
in such local data. The Secretary of Native Affairs, for example, all-
uded to "the prevalent idea in the native mind that the Boer has been
displaced on the land in favour of the native." And as late as early-
1903, in fact. Smuts was beseeching Chamberlain to "make clear" to
the "many" tenants on Boer farms that such estates did not now belong
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to them, as they believed.
Further evidence of the peasantry's belief in the expropriation
of Boer landlords comes from its general expectation that its comm-
unal lands were to be significantly increased in the wake of the war
to the disadvantage of Boer landowners. In some cases it appears that
the imperial army fostered this expectation. The Kgatla, for example,
were convinced that the British had promised them that "in peace"
they "would be given the territory" (in the western Transvaal) that
"they had controlled during the war." They had "fully" expected
that "farms would be taken from the Boers and given to them . ' In
the aftermath of the war, they were said to be "preparing to approach"
the Government "on the subject of additional land being given them in
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consideration of the services they rendered during the war. In the
north-western Transvaal, tenants evidently "expected great things in
the way of free grants of land after the war." And, as has already
been noted, in the northern Transvaal, rural blacks expected the re-
turn of ancestral lands appropriated by the Boers. In the eastern
reaches of the colony, the Peel peasantry sought the extension of
its lands at the expense of the property of land companies to whom
land had been alienated before the war. They considered th£t their
"material assistance" to the British during the war "entitled" them to
"the enlargement of their... Location so as to include a number of...
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adjoining farms." . And in the Northern Middelburg District, an ass-
embly of peasant leaders revealed that they too appear to have expec-
ted post-war grants of land which they immediately set about request-
48ing. This may be the underlying reason why, for some months after
the war there, the borders between certain locations and Boer farms -
in effect, the boundaries between communal and private property -
remained sites of "friction" between peasant communities and landown-
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ers.
Many former farm workers, in fact, believed that they were going
to be given land at war's end. Officials in charge of black refugees
were thus instructed to make such people "clearly understand" that
this was not the case and that they were not to "delay their return to
their former masters in the hopes (sic) of obtaining farms of their
own." But this hope was clearly one of the major reasons for the
general rallying of rural blacks to the British cause during- the South.
African War.
6. The Flouting of the Terms of Tenancy
One index _of the way in which farm workers used the conditions
of war (and the new employment opportunities thrown U P by it) to es-
cape the alienation they suffered on agrarian estates is provided by
the numerous instances in which they deserted their places of employ-
ment during the war, or simply avoided work on farms entirely. The
scale of such desertion in the Boer states is suggested by the fact
that, in them, farm workers were forbidden - under pain of imprison-
ment - from leaving their employers' estates for the duration of the
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war.
Such intimidation, however, was to be of little avail. During
the war, the number of workers "who...left their Dutch masters' farms"
without giving notice - and who "refused" "to return" to them when
"called upon to" after the conflict - was great enough to spawn a sig-
nificant legal struggle between landlords and former-tenants. A "very
large number" of tenants, in fact, were to bring a "test case" to the
Supreme Court to attempt (successfully) to cjuash
 a magisterial ruiing
that their actions had been illegal, despite the war-time absence of
54their landlords. Sotho refugees - who had previously been tenants
on farms in the Krugersdorp, Rustenburg and Potchefstroom Districts -
resisted returning to their landlords and sought recognised communal
lands for themselves. The Commissioner of Native Affairs was quite
correct to remark, in August 1902, that it was "common" for former-
tenants (he designated them "the natives") to complain that they
"cannot any longer live with the Boers". And voluminous evidence
can be cited of the refusal of tenants and servants to return to
their landlords and masters in the post-war Transvaal .
An outright refusal to labour for landowners (rather than deser-
tion or a refusal to return - to them) was perhaps the predominant meth-
od by which tenants withdrew their labour-power from their exploiters
during and after the South African War. This was the potentially rev-
olutionary method since it would generally be undertaken by workers
living on. the estates, ef. landowners under relationships of tenancy.
Desertion left the authority of landlords over their lands - and the
realm of private property - untouched; the refusal to render labour
service, however, struck at the heart of the landowners' world: the
manifest disobedience of such an action undermined master-servant
relations whilst, at the same time, the refusal to render rent in
labour threw back the claims of private property.
In fact, the refusal of rural workers to labour for returning
Boer landlords was a general phenomenon in the aftermath of the war.
"The question of labour on farms", wrote the NC responsible for the
northern Transvaal, "seems one that the natives are quite agreed upon
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to resist". In the eastern Transvaal, Sekhukhune instructed his
Pedi followers not to work for returning landlords; and in this re-
gion, farmers seem to have been exasperated by the refusal of tenants
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to labour for them. In the south-eastern Transvaal, a similar phe-
nomenon was manifest. The NC in charge of the South and Central
Transvaal, meanwhile, noted that "natives at first appear to be will-
ing to do anything rather than work for the Boers" and in the months
that followed he chronicled the attempts of blacks to flout their
contractual obligations to labour, or to escape tenancy entirely.
In August 1902, a police report: from the western Transvaal reported
that, around Ventersdorp, blacks were "unwilling to work for Burgh-
ers". The north-western Transvaal provides its compliment of sim-
ilar evidence; there the refusal to labour for landlords was great
enough to threaten a season's crops. In fact, in the Waterburg Dis-
trict, the "spectacle" was to be observed of the tenants "residing on
private property", sowing crops which they were certain they would
..64
reap and "doing nothing in return.
Africans "all over the country...despise Boers and...refuse to
work for them"; "The general complaint against...squatters is that
they will not now work for the Boers on their farms/* These state-
ments - of the Secretary of Native Affairs and the South African Con-
stabulary (SAC) respectively - were delivered in August 1902. A
few months later, a journalist was reporting in a similar vein. And,
in fact, well into 1903, a magistrate could complain that blacks
thought they had "a right to squat on farms and do no work for the
fanner." The refusal to render labour-service to the returning land-
lords was connected to the widespread belief amongst rural workers
that the Boer landowning class had been expropriated - a connection
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expl icitly made by at least one NC. Such workers appear to have
been confident that "there would not be the necessity to perform'*
eg
such "work as they performed under Boer rule.' They "generally
thought that after the war it was the intention" of the British Govern"
ment to have "cancelled** "all their engagements" "to their landlor-
70ds". • . A world without landlords, then, appears to have been both
the hope and expectation of rural working people in the aftermath
of the war. Indeed, some black tenants were explicit in formulating
this: in the north-western Transvaal, there were those who "expressed
...their idea of the future" as one in which "they were to work fair
-17-
riobody.fr
There is a sense in which the refusal of agrarian working people
to labour for returning landlords points to the fount of their aliena-
tion on the Transvaal farm in, the early-twentieth century. And it
should not be forgotten that, for example, in the north-western Trans-
vaal, it was a "majority" of tenants who "absolutely refused to work"
for such landlords in the wake of the Boer War until, at length, they
were forced to realise "that there was no middle course between
— 72.
complying...or being evicted". For Marx, "work" ( or "labour") -
the transformation of the natural world into useful objects - is the
fundamental characteristic of humankind: the "process" by which human
beings (and societies) "medfate, regulate and control the metablism
between themselves and nature" transforming it and "appropriating" its
materials in "a form adapted to their own needs". It is this incessant
transformation of the environment, in effect altering the world in
which people live, which lies at the core of the incessant transform-
ation of human nature itself. On the landlord's estate, however,
"work" - the stamp of humanity - becomes the badge of oppression. For
rural workers on it, labour ceases to be the process, under their com-
mand - by which they come to regulate and control the natural world.
Indeed, it becomes the very inversion of this: "the process of pro-
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duction has mastery over" them "instead of the opposite". The re-
fusal of workers to_labour for landlords after the Boer War, then, can
be seen as an attempt to restore "work" to a more logical place in
human existence.
7. The General Overturning of Master-Servant/Landlord-Tenant
The war-time expropriation of the Boer landlord class, and the role
played in this by the rural underclasses, had turned the Transvaal
rural world upside down. A contemporary newspaper noted that return-
ing farmers were sometimes "offered violence" by blacks ; in the dis
tricts of Vryheid, Waterburg and Rustenburg, "peasants and tenants
forcibly resisted the return of Boer families to their"homes"; and
this resistance was to find a powerful symbol when the very commander
of the Boer forces, Louis Botha, was run off his farm by his workers
who told him that he "had no business there" and that he "had better
leave". Moreover, aside from the refusal to render labour-service
already described, there was considerable resistance to paying rent
of any kind. In the Northern Transvaal, where the returning landlords
were merely broaching the matter, the "question of private rents" was
said to be "worrying" tenants "a good deal". The NC responsible for
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the region was convinced that "a good deal of difficulty" would "be
experienced" "when, and if" "back rents" accumulated "during the
war" were collected. It appears, in fact, as if the tenants concerned
sought to quarrantine themselves entirely from contact with the land-
owning class: "the chief s.... living- on farms"", wrote this NC, "mostly
ask to have locations set apart for them."" In the north-western Trans-
vaal, the NC was - more than two months after the end of the war -
encountering a few cases of tenants who had "so far, refused to pay"
their landlords "either in rent or labour contrary to their old agree-
ments". In the Pretoria and Heidelburg Districts, the attempts of
landlords to retrieve their unfortunate circumstances by raising rents
were creating "difficulties'1. 7 What seems clear is that, after the
Boer War, many landlords were to find - as did J. P. Meyer on his
farm "Cypherskuil", south of Nylstroom - tenants claiming "a perfect
no
right to live on farms without paying rent."
The attempts to prevent the return of landlords, the withdrawal
of labour-power, the refusal to pay rent or fulfill contractual oblig-
ations, the occupation of Boer land - these were general phenomena on
Transvaal farms in the wake of the war. Together they constituted a
very considerable disconnection of the circuits of exploitation by
agrarian working people. It is for these reasons that landlords re-
turning to their farms were to find a transformation of human rela-
tionships attendant upon the upheavals of war. Farmers found "a recal-
citrant spirit'1 amongst their workers ; reports of rural blacks
being "above themselves" and "impudent" to Boers were common;80 "great
8 1insolence" was another complaint. There were reports of workers
flouring the authority of landlords and "roaming about" without pass-
es, "refusing to obey orders". It can therefore come as no surprise
that, early in 1903, Boer representatives - in a supplication in which
the word "native" would more correctly read "worker and peasant" - in-
formed Joseph Chamberlain of the "grave character of the native quest-
ion". Considering it "their duty to point out" that the "political and
social upheaval" attendant upon the war had created a consciousness
("a spirit and feeling") "which must be. . .of grave consequence to the
white population", they revested that it be made "plain to the nat-
ives" that the war had left relations between themselves and whites
, 83
unchanged. -
8'. The Restoration of Pr-ivate Property and the Landowning Class
If the British Administration (with its coercive apparatus) had left
the returning Boers and the agrarian workers to their own devices on '
the farms, if it had not intervened in the class struggle between
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them, then the Boer landowners - the fundamental rural ruling class of
the Transvaal - may have been unable to restore its existence. So sw-
eeping had its expropriation been, so crushed was it by the war, and
so armed (as we shall reveal) were agrarian workers that this was a
real possibility in 1902. In effect, the state and productive power of
the Boer landowners had been utterly broken: the 'republican' writ ran
nowhere in the Transvaal by the end of the war; agrarian production
directed by landlords on Boer farms was virtually nil; access to land,
labour-power and livestock - the basic factors of production - was
effectively denied the landowners, in great part through the actions
of rural workers themselves.
It was at this point that the character of the state from which
the imperial army was sent - and the deep, underlying reasons for
which it fought the war - became decisive. The broad historical field
of force which produced the Boer War has recently been the subject of
a seminal essay by Stanley Trapdio and Shula Marks. Its essential as-
pects are known well-enough. The incompatibility of Paul Kruger's ZAR
with - and its fettering of - the precocious capitalist development
directed by the Randlords; the contradictions within British capital-
ism itself which drove it increasingly into its role as the finance
(rather than the industrial) capital centre of the world; Britain's
need, consequently, to control the Transvaal's gold resources - the
refraction of all these through the local politics of the Transvaal
and the strategic plans and ideological discourse of British imperial-
ism made war inevitable. The cardinal reason for the war was to restr-
ucture the Transvaal state so as to make it appropriate to the needs
of mining capital and to integrate that state into the political, fin-
ancial and commercial network of the British Empire.
But if the war was fought against a somewhat archaic ruling class
of landowners, whose state was manifestly unable to meet the demands
of the most sudden and dynamic industrial revolution on the continent
of Africa, it was not a war fought against private property. The Bri-
tish Army had encouraged the rural underclasses to flout Boer property
rights - to sack and destroy farmsteads"and crops, loot livestock and
drive landlords off their land. But the (capitalist) world which the
British sought to make in the Transvaal had as its primary prerequis-
ite the creation of a proletariat. And basic to the creation of such a
class is the progressive separation of peasants from the means to sus-
tain themselves independently: in short, the expropriation of the pea-
santry. The rise of a class of landowners in the Transvaal, "who conq-
uered peasant lands and parcelled them .out under the feet of their or-
iginal inhabitants was fundamental to this process of expropriation.
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To have not reconstituted this class, to have left its property unre-
stored and in peasant hands would have been tantamount to reversing
the process of proletarianisation that Boer, primitive accumulation
had begun. The post-war administration of the Transvaal had not merely
to cease mobilising agrarian workers against a rural ruling class; it
had actively to refound a world of capsized class relations: the res-
toration of livestock, land and labour-power to Boer landowners was
crucial to this, as was the disarmament of rural working people.
i. Livestock
By the Treaty of Vereeniging, Boers were permitted to keep livestock
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they had looted from blacks during the war. Almost immediately after
this treaty was signed, it appears to have become government policy to
restore to Boer farmers cattle looted from them by the peasantry.These
two policies now combined to detonate an acute struggle over 1ivestock
between landlord and peasant. One observer predicted "serious trouble1*
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before the "question" was "settled"; peasants in one region were re-
ported to be- "very dissatisfied" over the matter and its was feared
8*7
that the area might become enflamed by the issue. In the Central Tr-
ansvaal, despite being escorted by SAC troopers, Boers seeking to re-
possess livestock appear to have encountered a successful resistance
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on the part of armed peasants. In the Lydenburg District, meanwhile,
Pedi peasants - fearing
 (having to give up cattle looted from Boers -
engaged in the slaughter, consumption, sale and disposal of such "gre-
at numbers" of captured cattle that the new government was forced to
call a halt to the butchery until it could ascertain how the unfortun-
,
 t , ,89ate beasts were obtained.
Perhaps the most cogent proof of the general discontent with which
the British had to contend on the issue lies in the delicacy of the
strategy which they devised to implement their policy. Compensation
(UP to the full value of the beasts concerned, sometimes) was offered
to encourage peasants to return expropriated livestock; and ultimately
the peasantry was offered compensation for animals of theirs which
90they could prove were in Boer hands. The . functionaries who arranged
the transfers of livestock were aware of the patience and caution with
which they had to proceed1 one drew attention to his adoption of a
"conciliatory attitude"" in such matters and his avoidance of "string-
ent and severe methods"; another advised Boers seeking the return of
their cattle to approach the matter diplomatically through "Chiefs"
rather than bring cases against individuals - a strategy which brought
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success in "many instances". Generally, the British were too wary of
its possible repercussions to provoke the peasantry (which was well-
armed at this time) by deploying- armed force in attempting to re-
store cattle to the Boers. Where this occurred - around Bronkhorst-
spruit - it almost triggered an armed conflict and the local NC was
quick to instruct the local SAC detachment not to "interfere or en-
92quire into any cases of Boer cattle in the possession of Natives".
The British Administration's investment in a policy of caution
and compensation appears to have brought some dividends. There is
some evidence of the new government overseeing the restitution of
of Boer cattle to its original owners, as well as tenants returning
property which they had concealed for their landlords during the
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war. But ultimately, British policy in this regard was to be ov-
erturned by the resistance of agrarian working people. So great was
their dissatisfaction with the livestock-restitution arrangements th-
at, in order to resolve it, native commissioners were instructed to
attempt to induce Boers to surrender to blacks cattle they had seized
from them - although this instruction was hastily withdrawn on the
grounds that Boers were entitled to keep such livestock under the
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Treaty of Vereeniging. In the end, the post-war government was forc-
ed to set aside its policy and transform the whole question into one
"of legal process for either Boers or Natives to establish their case
in a Court of Law for restoration of any cattle claimed by them to be
.t95in illegal possession of others." What led to this outcome was the
intention of one peasant leader (Malakute in the Northern Middelburg)
to contest the legality" of the British policy in the High Court and,
if necessary in the Privy Council itself. This led to the fear that
the policy might be decalared invalid (after all, peasants had often
looted cattle under British instruction; Boers had no such authorisa-
tion and yet they were not reciuired to restore their loot to its orig-
inal owners). Such a decision, moreover, would shake the authority of
of the post-war administrators in the eyes of the peasantry.
In effect, the class struggle had cancelled one aspect of the
post-war Administration's design. The peasantry made felt its dissati-
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sfaction, its "strong feeling of injustice" , in regard to the inten-
ded restitution arrangements. Active resistance to the restoration of
Boer property was much in evidence and it could run to the outright
destruction of Boer chattel. The threat of armed conflict over the qu-
estion was ever-present: in fact, the SAC had to patrol constantly be-
tween the Boer and Kgatla communities at Soulspoort to prevent blood-
shed arising from Afrikaner attempts to reclaim livestock looted from
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local landlords. "Rumours of unrest" amongst the peasantry were re-
ported from the Pretoria District where the Boers' forcible repossess-
99ion of stock was "resented" by blacks. So great was the resistance
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across the Transvaal that those officials most intimately connected
with the peasantry - the native commissioners - began to agitate agai-
nst the policy which they were initially instructed to carry out.
The class struggle over cattle, then, took on significant propor-
tions. The intense, sometimes brutal, struggle of the peasants pushed
their case through successive levels of authority - passed the landl-
ords and constabulary to the NCs, then beyond those officials to their
commanders and thence to the Lieutenant-Govemor. When they threatened
to reach out to London, to the still more illustrious Privy Council
and hold the military authorities to their war-time word, the Colonial
Administration called a halt to the administrative restoration of ex-
propriated Boer stock. In the end, peasants surrendered only a few hu-
dred beasts to their pre-war owners in terms of the initial British
res
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policy of livestock titution. A multitude more than this remain-
ed in peasant hands.
ii. The ideological offensive to restore private property and landlord
authority
If the landlords were to be restored as a class then the consciousne-
ss, which had been created in agrarian workers by the expropriation of
the Boers and the role of such workers in this, had to be licjuidated.
It was the native commissioners who were given this ideological task.
The NCs toured the countryside, holding meetings with peasants, disab-
using them of the notion that the Boers had been expropriated for all
time. The Lydenburg NC, for example, informed the Pedi that their "ge-
neral impression" in regard to this was incorrect: "the land belongs
to the Boers as before the war. You must understand", he reiterated,
"that the land is still the property of the Boers". And similar in-
formation was conveyed at other meetings in the rural Transvaal.
The idea (or hope) that peasant lands would be extended, or that rural
workers would be able to begin farming on their own account, was quic-
kly dispelled. Black refugees were amongst the first to have their ho-
pes dashed in this regard; whilst, in the Western Transvaal, the
local NC "discouraged** the Kgatla from approaching the Government "on
the subject of additional land" and stressed that the new administra-
tion would "not appropriate Boer farms for their benefit." By late-
October 1902, the Secretary of Native Affairs could remark, quite cor-
rectly, to higher authority that the "prevalent idea** amongst blacks -
that Boers had "been displaced on the land" in their favour - was **be-
nat-
TDS"
ing rapidly removed from their minds.*'-.. And by early-1903, the 
ive commissioners reported the successful execution of this task.
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A sustained propoganda-offensive was also launched to restore the
authority of the landlords. From district after district comes eviden-
ce of the NCs and others informing rural blacks that if they wished to
live on private property then they had to strike agreements of tenancy
1 09
with the owners of that property. There was, moreover, a campaign
to end the rural working classes' withdrawal of labour-power from lan-
dlords and the general transformation of master-servant relations,that
were such notable phenomena of the agrarian Transvaal in the aftermath
of the war. Farm workers, one newspaper reported in September 1902,
were "being made to understand that the fortunes of war" had "nothing
to do with the mutual obligations of master and servant". Refugees
being repatriated were instructed to "serve their old and new masters"
111
"faithfully". In the northern Transvaal, the refusal of "people...
to work for Boers returning to their farms" led "the Commissioners" to
summon local "Chiefs" to a series of "indabas" on the question. Only
with "considerable difficulty" was it "impressed upon" them that tena-
112
nts had to "work or quit the farms." In the Pretoria District, when
faced with a general desire on the part of rural blacks to escape lab-
ouring for Boers, the NC firmly exhorted "them to apply themselves di-
ligently to labour either at farms, on the Mines or at Public Wo-
rk". And in the Lydenburg District, where Sekhukhune had instructed
the Pedi not to labour for returning farmers, the NC lost no time in
informing the Pedi leader, and his followers, that he had "no right
over persons on private property."
In other ways, the'new British administration facilitated the
restoration of labour-power to returning Boers. The head of the Nat-
ive Refugee Department considered the aim of his department "from the
beginning to look upon the natives as an asset of the farming indust-
ry, and to preserve them...for this industry". The refugee camps
were liquidated as soon as possible: from September 1st 1902, the pri-
ce of maize sold to its inmates was doubled; and by November only
3 000 out of more than 55 000 black refugees in the Transvaal camps
remained to be repatriated. "Every assistance" was given to employers
to get their workers "away speedily" so that delays would not be caus-
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ed to returning farmers. Outside, the camps, officials were equally
zealous in aiding farmers with their 'labour problems'. The NC of the
Eastern Transvaal was "rendering" returning landlords "every assistan-
ce to get their servants back at once"; that of the north-western Tra-
nsvaal was generally "doing" his "best to get" tenants "on to the old
farms again*' - and where workers in the region were successful in res-
isting the labour-exactions of landlords, he sought to assist farmers
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"by importing labour". . The NCs were indeed crucial to restoring re-
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lationships- of tenancy. A contemporary journalist was correct to note
their "insist Cancel upon" resistant labour tenants •"carrying- out the
letter of their contractCs) of tenure.*" And their role in this is con-
firmed by archival evidence.
In this process of re-establishing' relationships between employ-
ers and workers* the British administration appears, as far as possi-
ble, to have avoided coercion, preferring diplomacy and mediation to
rash measures which might have summoned forth yet more resistance from
11 9
working people. The same may be said of this administration's atte-
mpts to resolve problems arising from the tenantry's cultivation of
the lands of its masters. Th,e Commissioner of Native Affairs himself
considered this "a matter in which more is to be done by judicious ar-
rangement than by any set of instructions. " The reimposition of lan-
dlord authority - let us not forget it - involved the reimposition of
relationships in which labour assumes an alienated character: in it,
wrote Marx, the worker experiences • "a loss of his self", since his lab-
our does not belong "to him bur to another" and therefore "in it he
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belongs not to himself but to another." A total and immediate re-
imposition of such relationships in the aftermath of the Boer War mi-
ght have touched off a period of acute class struggle. And the Brit-
ish initially held down the level of alien labour (sometimes mediated
through a rent-in-kind) in which the Transvaal tenantry was submerged.
In the eastern Transvaal, for example, tenants occupying their landow-
ners ' estates were permitted to reap the crops they had sown, give to
the landlord a (relatively-favourable) third of the harvest and only
then either "hand" the "land back to" its "owner" or a strike a cont-
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ract of tenancy for the following year. In the' north-western Tran-
svaal, meanwhile, the "farm servant or tenant, refusing to work or to
fulfil his part of the contract" was given "three months notice to
quit." Most of these workers "refused to work during this three mon-
ths" (sic). Only under threat of eviction, were they to "generally"
agree to "a fresh contract" with the landlords. The resistance to al-
ien labour, however, was to cost the landlords dear. "There is no dou-
bt", reported the NC concerned, "that a certain loss in,..crops has
arisen from the refusal of Natives to work for farmers until the three
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months notice was up."
By proclamation 27 &t 1901, the British Administration had rest-
ored the contractual obligations of tenants to Transvaal landlords and
specified that lessees were to pay rent from 9th October 1901 - or~
from the date of "beneficial occupation"" if it was later than that
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date. But the precise date from which such obligations were restor-
ed to landlords appears to have been considerably after that date: thefcV*,vidence in above aragraph comes from long after it. Rent once~over-
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thrown is not easily restored.
iii. The use of coercion, in. the restoration of the landlords
Diplomacy, propaganda and the mere presence (or threatened use) of
imperial coercive machinery, however, proved themselves insufficient
to restore the class rule of the landlords. Where they failed actual
force was employed. In the Pilansberg region of the western Transvaal,
effectively under Kgatla control, no landlords felt safe enough to re-
turn to their farms during- 1902; in 1903, however, "relying on the So-
uth African Constabulary'*, some were able to. The gradual, though by
no means complete, restoration of Pilansberg farms to their white own-
ers was ultimately to depend in no small measure on the SAC. And
the same may be said for other regions of the Transvaal: according to
one historian, "much of the work of the South African Constabulary du-
ring 1902 was devoted to making possible the resettlement by Boer fam-
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ilies of their lands." Its role in the reconstiturion of master-
servant relations was no less important: in the aftermath of the war
SAC detachments were despatched to areas - such as Hamanskraal, Doorn-
kloof and Roos Senekal - where blacks were reported "above themselv-
es"; and, by August 1902, the Constabulary was already active in sett-
1 28ling "small differences" between the classes on farms.
Joseph Chamberlain himself assured the Boers that "the power of
the Government" would be, used to compel recalcitrant tenants to fulfil
their contractual obligations - and he considered the SAC an essential
component of that power. The Constabulary were the "friends" of Boer
landlords, a force "to help you through your troubles"; in dealing
with the insubordinate, farmers were instructed "not" to "hesitate to
apply to the S.A.C." It was "a police force for your production (sic)"
- the typographical error which rendered "protection" as "production",
in fact; made for the clearest possible statement of a central funct-
ion of the police in the post-war rural Transvaal: to restore to the
landowning class its command of the productive activity carried on on
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private property. And it was not only the SAC which was used in th-
is task: on occasion, the defeated landlords were themselves permitted
130to take up arms again in order to possess contested land.
Moreover, once the jvetwork of NCs and pass officers was effecti-
vely in place in the rural Transvaal, those officials - armed with pu-
nitive powers - could also coerce workers into accepting the restor-
ation of their exploiters1 control: farm workers who brazenly flouted
the authority of their employers and left their estates without pass-
es - such as the workers on the farm "Rooikrantz" in the Krugersdorp
District - might get hauled before the local Pass Officer and sent off
to. the police with a recommendation that they be proceeded against.
The NCs evidently kept a close watch on such offenders: in the months
after the war/ for example, the NC at Rustenburg ^ensured .that, a
score of "Petty cases, such as Contravention of the Pass Law'" were
"adjudicated upon** and "disposed of". For those who fell foul of the
pass laws, it is doubtful that they viewed the cases against thems-elv—
es as "petty": they could result in offenders being sentenced to six
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months in prison. Meanwhile, tenants refusing to pay rent - such as
those on J. P- Meyer's farm in the Waterburg District - could always
be instructed by the local NC to strike agreements with their landlor-
ds or leave their properties.
iv. The disarmament of rural working people
By the end of the South African War, there were very many more thousa-
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nds of armed blacks than armed Boers. In the giant Waterburg Dist-
rict, more than one out of every three African men was armed; in the
Lydenburg District, "nearly every male" black person was "armed wiCth]
some gun" and "a great many" had "Lee-Metfords and Mausers in their
possession."' In the northern Transvaal, the scale of peasant armament
was extraordinary. Writing in October 1902, the NC at Pietersburg cou-
ld report that in a single fortnight 12 000 blacks, had been to his of-
fice "to deliver up arms". And by the time he had made this report,
peasants in the Spelonken and Haernetsburg districts had "handed in"
"about 6 000 to.7 000 arms." The "general complaint" "from outside dis
tricts" in the northern Transvaal in early-September 1902 was that ar-
eas in which peasants were concentrated "bore very much the character
of military camps" whose inhabitants "were arrogant and truculent."
Once the process of disarmament began in the region," the peasantry di-
splayed its armed might with a certain martial flair: "Morning after
morning there file[d] through" Pietersburg "troops of armed natives,
who" were "not content to pass unnoticed, the sound of their marching
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songs .. .compelling the attention of the inhabitants." In fact, the-
re is a mass of evidence suggesting the degree to which peasants were
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armed, and often openly-armed, in the post-war Transvaal. Some of
their weaponry they may have acquired before the Boer War but some of
their rifles were, no doubt, "pilfered, purchased or found during the
war" itself. The jnagfiitude of peasant armament is suggested by the
number of weapons blacks ultimately surrendered to the British (and
such a number does not include secreted weapons). This figure was to
run to more than 50 000; and whilst only just over 12% of these were
adjudged "modern", the others - breech-loaders though they were -would
have a. fatal effectiveness at close quarters, the distance at which
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altercations with landlords had to occur.
In. almost all aspects of class relations, whether or not rural
workers possessed arms at war's end was decisive. In the Eastern Tran-
svaal, for example, tenants on the farms "Rooival" and "Uitzoek" who
were refusing to labour for their Lydenburg landlords were noted -
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again and again - to be "armed with rifles" In at least one report,
the SAC noted that where blacks "declinetd) to work" they were also
1 39
"armed" "to a great extent". Again it was the "well armed" follow-
ers of Mathebe who prevented the restitution of cattle to a party of
140Bronkhorstspruit Boers. And it would have been armed rural workers
who would have been most successful in preventing the return of land-
lords. As a contemporary newspaper noted: "The causes which led to the
determination of the Government to disarm the natives were that they
were becoming a positive danger to the Boers returning to...farms."
Given these facts, the disarmament of rural workers became a mat-
ter of urgency for the new British government of the Transvaal . And
those officials most concerned with the restoration of landlord auth-
ority - saw the issue as "a burning one". Disarmament called for "un-
deiayed attention", they informed higher authority, and it would be
"watched with great anxiety by the Dutch". By the Transvaal Arms
and Ammunition Ordinance (No. 13 of 1902), then, the complete disarm-
ament of black people was decreed. They were given two (later extended
to five) months from August 7th 1902 to surrender weapons or face dra-
conian penalties: summary arrest and up to a year's imprisonment with
hard labour. Peasants greeted the disarmament order with sullenness
and dissatisfaction and resistance to it was expected: in at least one
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case, armed revolt was anticipated. There is no doubt that instanc-
es of secretion took place: in the Western Transvaal, the Kgatla secr-
eted large numbers of their rifles across the border in Bechuanaland
and, indeed, such attempts were expected to be made generally along
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the Transvaal's border with that Protectorate; the Pedi were expec-
ted to conceal some weapons; and evidence from Districts as far apart
from one another as Barberton, Middelburg and Waterburg could be cited
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of the peasantry's secretion of weapons. But such instances were
not, in the end, historically typical or significant. The "character-
istic tendency towards secretion", initially spoken of by the Comissi-
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oner of Native Affairs-, appears not to have eventuated.
The tendency, in fact, appears to have been quite the opposite.
From district after district, came reports of a basically unprob-lem-
atical disarmament of the peasantry - even from areas in which resist-
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ance had been expected. How is this to be explained?
Firstly, the administrators presiding over the disarmament did so
with considerable skill: a blundering, coercive policy might have
led not only to the widespread secretion of weapons but to actual
armed revolts. NCs were warned that disarmament was a "difficult
question" and they were expected to display "watchfulness and dis-
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cretion" in its .resolution. The punitive sections of the disarm-
ament ordinance must have been, made clear to armed blacks but
there seems to have been a reluctance to bring them into play. The
initial granting of two months to blacks to surrender their arms
legally ( and its extension by a further three later on ) also
suggests that the imperial administration was concerned not to provoke
a struggle over the issue. And NCs were warned against - and, where
necessary, prevented from -using armed coercion in their disarmament
efforts. These were to be conducted "in a quiet and cautious way" and
higher authority was to be consulted in the event of resistance.
The Commissioner of Native Affairs could well congratulate himself -
and did so - on the wisdom of this policy of using his departmental
officials to disarm blacks rather than relying on "Military or Police"
intervention to do so. He knew well-enough the warnings "received from
all sides" "that any attempt to disarm the natives" would be a "dang-
erous experiment" which was "certain to lead to war". By avoiding
the unnecessary combustion of martial displays, and by despatching di-
plomats rather than bullies to control it, he msde the experiment much
less dangerous than it might have been.
Where necessary, areas in which resistance to disarmament was ex-
pected could be (temporarily) passed over in favour of those where ac-
quiescence was predicted. Peasants in a particular region would thus
be given a 'lead' of submissiveness rather than defiance; whilst those
who intended to resist would be progressively isolated and weakened as
the collective armed strength of their class was sapped. Such a strat-
egy was used to great effect in the northern Transvaal . The NC there
was careful to avoid rushing through disarmament in an area, like the
woodbush region, where considerable antagonism might have been encoun-
tered. Bridling his efforts there, he spurred them on in "the Pieters-
burg ward first", ^ knowing that the peasantry's acquiescence there
"would be closely observed and followed by the other districts." Al-
most with an equestrian's sense of his skill, this official could ult-
imately remark: "By pressing the willing horse first, I think we succ-
eeded.
To smooth the transition to full-disarmament, moreover, blacks
were paid for each weapon they surrendered; ultimately more than£66 000 was paid out to Africans in compensation for weapons and ammu-
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nition surrendered ; and such money could - and was to be - put to
good, use in paying taxes which might otherwise only have been met thr-
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ough a spell of wage-labour. The disarmament ordinance, too, revea-
led some subtlety in its exploitation of the structure of power and
authority in the peasant village: its section 29 provided for "Chiefs
and Headmen to receive a licence to be in possession of arms". NCs we-
re advised to grant these in "exceptional cases" since it might induce
peasant leaders "more readily and promptly" to cooperate "in securing
surrenders from...people under them" and in checking the secretion of
weapons. In the end , scores of weapons were left in the hands of le-
aders of rural blacks in this way.
Ultimately, however, it was neither careful treading and compens-
ation nor kowtowing to the village elders which was to prove the sing-
le most decisive factor in ensuring the disarmament of rural blacks.
That factor was the presence of brute coercive force. The law on this
matter (with its draconian penalties) must have been made abundantly
clear to the peasantry, with whom countless meetings on the disarmamei-
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nt question were held. The year in prison with hard labour that an
offender against the law might suffer could be augmented with a fine
of £250 - almost ecruivalent to many a farm worker's wages for ten
1 57years. Moreover, given the wide powers of search allowed officials
1 58if they suspected the illegal possession of arms by blacks, it would
have been difficult to conceal arms successfully; and those officials
entrusted with supervising disarmament proved themselves adept at mon-
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itoring infractions of the law. In fact, so confident of his Depar-
tments ability to track down and punish.illegally-armed blacks was the
Commissioner of Native Affairs that, early in 1903, he could smugly
remark that, whilst some peasants "may have secreted" some arms - and
"perhaps a little ammunition" - they would "never" be able to produce
them "without fear of confiscation and punishment." "Meanwhile", he
continued, "those kept back will get rusty in caves or underground."160
Most important of all, looming behind the disarmament ordinance
was the imperial army. Massed across the countryside, and poised to
strike at any point-in the Transvaal, it was undoubtedly the decisive
factor in the disarmament of the peasantry. And those overseeing the
process of disarmament were alive to this fact: in August 1902, the
Lydenburg NC - dismayed at the impending withdrawal of the Royal Irish
Regiment from his district - stressed the need to keep it stationed
there in view of the disarmament ordinance "now in force" in the reg-
ion; within days, this NCfs fears were allayed by the information that
his superordinates had "arranged" for the "maintenance of" a "suffici-
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ent garrison at Lydenburg". Troops, however, do not appear to have
been used much in disarming blacks: in the Barberton District, Steniak~
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er's Horse "practically disarmed every native" once "peace was procl-
aimed'"; but there do not appear to be other examples of this kind.
However, it was not so much the actual, as the threatened or possible -
use of armed force against rural workers which convinced them to crive
up their arms. From zone after zone of the Transvaal comes evidence of
peasant leaders informing their followers and compatriots of the pun-
ishment that could be meted out if they refused to surrender arms:
from the northern Middelburg region: "Government
will punish those who refuse to hand in arms";
from Sekhukhuneland1.: "We must obey and not bring
trouble upon ourselves... .all guns must be handed in."
from the Pietersburg District, a speech by one peas-
ant leader, echoed by others: we are "to obey the
command"; we have "all quite recently seen the might
of the Government giving the order".(163)
Given the fact that they did not possess a coordinated strategy, few
rural blacks could have doubted the ability of the British to carry
out the threat delivered by one official: guns held back, he declared,
"we will simply seize". And, as was known by all, such seizure could
take a very violent form. In congratulating his commander on the tim-
ing of the disarment order, one NC wrote:
It' was done whilst everything the Native had recently
seen during the War was freshly imprinted on his mind
and he thoroughly understood the absurdity there would
be in attempting, even by a passive way, to resist
the order.(164)
The giant "army" of, Transvaal peasants under arms was reduced,
very rapidly, from more than 50 000 to (officially) just over 100. Th-
ese soldiers, moreover, were of the most conservative kind, being all
"chiefs, chieftainesses" or "headmen". The process by which rural
workers in the Transvaal were disarmed illustrates the fact that,_ in_
class society, every ordinance and law is underpinned by what John
Foster - in another context - has called "the ultimate military san-
ctions of class rule". .Such sanctions, as has been revealed, do not
necessarily have to be applied to be effective. But they must be pres-
ent.
The disarmament of the peasantry was fundamental to restoring the
class rule of the landlords. Writing in mid-October 1902 - by which
time almost 10 000 rifles had been surrende'red in the eastern Transv-
aal - the Lydenburg NC rqported that the "Boers say quite a change has
come over the Native and he is now quite civil again, and are (sic)
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going- back to the farms to work." In the northern Transvaal - the
area in which the peasantry had been described as "arrogant and truc-
ulent" - the "effects and result" of the surrender of over 30 000 arms
were marked: once deprived'of "the moral effect and power" of their
arms, "a tone of independence" had "perceptibly disappeared from-'the
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1 68people" concerned.
In the end, the peasantry's target - once the disarmament process
began - was not to be landlords or state functionaries. The imminent
surrender of their rifles rendered their ammunition redundant and they
squandered it, almost orgiastically, upon the wildlife of the Transv-
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aal. The countryside echoed with the sound of their gunfire. By
late-July 1902, the "destruction of game" in the Waterburg District
appears to have been "very great". "The buck", more than one Northern
Transvaal African remarked (with notable understatement) on surrender-
ing arms, "have earned a long rest". And, in the eastern Transvaal, so
"ruthless" a "destruction of game" was reported that the NC in charge
of the region was forced to ponder the problem of "game preserv-
1 70ing". Ammunition, which could later have been used to keep peasants
outside the orbit of the landlords' world, was instead discharged into
the natural world.
v. The role of the native commissioners in restoring Boer landowners
Fundamental to the process of restoring landlord authority in the cou-
ntryside was the establishment of a new and efficient Department of
Native Affairs. With it rural working people were subjected to the ap-
paratus of an effective capitalist state. Gone was the old rule of the
veldkornets, almost whimsical in its arbitrariness and heterogeneity.
Now the Transvaal was divided into 25 zones, each controlled by a sub-
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n£.zive commissioner. The activities of these administrators within
their respective areas were coordinated by the grid of authority imme-
diately above them: the five native commissioners, whose designations
- Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Pretoria, Rustenburg and Waterburg - are
misleading. Between them, these five functionaries comprehended all
rural regions of the Transvaal.
The pre-war Volksraad had, in 1885, created a system of NCs under
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a Superintendent of Native Affairs. But the post-war administration
was only too aware of the inability of this system to function as it
was intended to. Soon after the war, the new NCs were warned of the
"disorder" they would find: "everything" - it was said - had-been
"complicated by regulations" "partly made" by various authorities. And
the pre-war native commissioners were described as officials who were
"mostly local farmers" and who "suited things to their own ends".
Such officials, obviously, were inadecruate to the task of implementing
national policies in regard to taxation, communal lands, eviction and
1 74labour-control. After the war, however, the NC was a Professional
administrator aided by a staff of clerks, interpreters and constables.
These constables, moreover, were distinct from the SAC forces station-
ed throughout the country - and with such forces the local native com-
issioner could work "splendidly**.175
The * teeth' of the NCs were strengthened and sharpened by the
conferment upon them of "judicial powers" "at least ecjuivalent to the
powers of Resident magistrates in Civil and Criminal cases between Na-
tives"; and by their "special jurisdiction" to repress cattle theft.
Empowered to fine offenders Cup to £10), imprison them (for up to six
months) and evict tenants (under the Scatters' Law), the NCs very ra-
rapidly became a powerful arm of landowners.176 And they were intend-
ed to be such. As the Commissioner of Native Affairs noted:
...it is a part of my system that farmers and land
owners in each District feel that on application to
any Native Commissioner they will immediately get
complaints...attended to."(177)
It was these officials - the NCs - who as we have shown, played the
crucial role in disarming rural workers and restoring private proper-
ty in the countryside. In those earlier, much more confident days of
South African capitalism, these functionaries could be - and were -
unashamed in the role they played. Indeed, the documents they wrote
are suffused with the energy, zeal and even delight that they brought
to their task.
9. A Class Restored and Mutated
Hence it was that the class of Boer landowners, brought to the very
edge of extinction by the war, was restored. In the northern Transva-
al, the most recalcitrant of the peasants who had occupied Boer land
were punished and the NC of the region was "pleased" "to report" that,
by early-1903, such "cases" had "practically come to an end and [that]
the natives" were "learning to respect the private ownership of land."
Somewhat earlier than this - by September 1902 - "Master and Servants'
cases" were "being satisfactorily dealt with" in the north-western Tr-
ansvaal; and a few months before, the NC for the Eastern Transvaal was
congratulating himself on "doing distinctly good work by assisting the
farmers with their labour difficulties." According toTrapido, most
tenancies were "re-established relatively soon after the war" in the
Transvaal. Indeed, police reports from the. Eastern Transvaal suggest a
rapid success in such re-establishment in the area, around Lydenburg.
The NC responsible for "Che Pretoria and Heidelburg Districts, meanwhi-
le could report that the initial "difficulties" arising from the refu-
sal of "many" tenants "to serve under the Squatters * Law" were being
generally "overcome": one of his subordinates commented "very favour-
ably" on the reconstitution of relationships of tenancy in his
area; and, early in 1903, the NC himself could remark that "generally"
.farmers were "satisfactorily supplied with native squatters" in the
area under his jurisdiction. The comprehensive campaign of the new Br-
itish Administration to restore the landowners was'evidently a great
success. Little wonder that one NC could register his conviction that
blacks in the region of his command "fully"' understood "the obligatio-
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ns due by" those "living on private properties."
Restoring the claims of private property and the authority of the
landlord, however, were not sufficient to restore the existence of a
class whose property had suffered such massive destruction during the
war. These had to be supplemented by material aid. Very swiftly, then,
the British arranged to secure 25 000 cattle and 1000 mules and, for
"the sole purpose of restocking" Boer farmers, the authorities "arran-
ged to grant loans to burghers" for up to £200. By the end of October
1902, the government had informed a "delegation of influential farm-
ers" in Pretoria that it "was willing to set aside...half a million**
pounds to aid landowners in their efforts to replenish their livesto-
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ck. The Repatriation Department, moreover, proved to be an able and
energetic agency for laying anew the basis for the renewal of produc-
tion on Boer farms: it supplied returning landlords and their families
with rations, materials for the rebuilding of houses, livestock (for
draught and breeding purposes), seed, agricultural implements,and ac-
tual ploughing contingents where fanners proved unable to organise pl-
1 80
oughing themselves. In fact, well over a million pounds was spent
on materials provided to Boers in their initial repatriation to their
farms - more than seventy times the amount spent on blacks repatriated
to their lands. A massive sum in compensation was to be awarded the
defeated Boers. Initially, it had been intended that this figure would
not exceed £3 000 000; ultimately, it was more than trebled to £ 9 T mi-
llion - almost twenty times the sum given blacks for their war-time
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losses in both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.
But if the world of the landowners was restored in the aftermath
of the Boer War, it was not cmite the same world. A series of mutatio-
ns were engineered within it. The local NC, whilst crucial to landlord
authority, was no longer simply synonymous with the prominent landown-
ers in a particular area. He could no longer "mingle administrative
duties with personal enrichment" and mete out "inconsistent treatme-
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nt" .to the various "Chiefs" under his jurisdiction. Local polic-
ies were now to be mesiTed into the much wider programme by which the
full development of capitalism in the Transvaal was to be achieved.
Within class relations themselves, changes were wrought of momentous
importance for the future. The post-war NCs knew well-enough the arch-
aic nature of the regime of the landlords, i t s dependence upon various
forms of unfree labour. "So many illegal things have been done in the
-34-
' past by the Native Commissioners and Field Cornets*',wrote one of them,
"that it is a little difficult to reconcile the Dutch farmers to the
law as it really stands." Under the "late Government", wrote another:
a farmer interpreted to suit himself the amount of
labour to be contributed by each Native residing on
his farm...and doubtless his interpretation held
good in the Courts of Law, i.e. if any cases of dis-
agreement went further than the arbitrary adjustment
of a Field-Cornet...
The NC in charge of the Eastern Transvaal, meanwhile, wrote in a sim-
ilar vein: "The natives in most cases under the old Government were
compelled by the Native Commissioners to provide labour for the farm-
1 S3
ers and in many cases to go.and live on the farms."
What was now foisted upon the landlords was the law of contract,
and this clearly struck a blow against the arbitrary exactions of lab-
our so prevalent in the pre-war Transvaal. In the eastern Transvaal,
the NC - aware of the absence of "properly" defined contract - was
zealous in "impressing upon all Dutch farmers the urgent necessity of
coming to a clear understanding with their..,tenants" as to the "ter-
ms" of their tenancy; he was also endeavouring "to get them to regis-
ter their agreements" at his office; in the northern Middelburg reg-
ion, also under his jurisdiction, he informed peasant leaders that
sub-NCs were "quite willing" to "assist" tenants in arranging "terms
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of residence" with their landlords. For the Pretoria NC, the "only
solution" to "our greatest worry" - how to restore the obligations of
tenants to landlords - -lay in having agreements between them "in writ-
ing", a process which he had initiated in the area under his jurisdic-
185tion.
Before the Boer War, some landlords had benefitted from social
relationships akin to slavery, especially in regard to their personal
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servants. When, therefore, the Native Refugee Department gave all
1 87black refugees (many of whom were the personal servants of Boers)
the right to refuse to return to a pre-war employer and gave them "the
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option of taking service with new masters" , it gave those who had
been held in bondage the rights of the 'free.' wage labourer. (And, in-
deed, after the war,' the British were active in attempting to licruid-
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ate relationships akin to slavery.) Former-tenants appear to have
exercised their new rights immediately: "Where any native objected to
return and live under lits former landlord", reported one NC, "he was
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met in his wishes as to where he preferred to live."
Nevertheless, there were clear limits to the restructuring of re-
lations on the farms - an apparent knowledge that an immediate trans-
ition to fully capitalist social relations was impossible and should
not be attempted. When, for example, the Waterburg NC proposed to pre-
.prevent landlords from making intermittent exaction of labour from te-
nants and indeed sought to induce Boer landlords to replace labour te-
nancy with a "fixed" "money rent" and "daily wage"/ he was rapidly in-
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structed to "avoid any" such "intercession". The new administrators
had to proceed cautiously. They could (and did) act against some of
the elements of forced labour in the countryside. Not only did they
bridle it, to some degree, on the part of the landlords, they abelish-
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ed the rights of veldkornets and others to commandeer labour. The
encouragement of written and registered contracts, moreover, provided
some of the legal forms appropriate to capitalist relations. But a rev-
olution in production itself was required for the massive agrarian es-
tates of the Transvaal to become capitalist enterprises. This still
lay in the future, though not the distant future. But, in its immedia-
te actions, the vanquishers of the ZAR signalled to the fundamental
classes of the countryside the direction in which they were to go. In
those first actions against forced labour, the Transvaal's new over-
lords ushered the farm worker towards the freedom of wage slavery
10.Aftermath
After the tremendous struggles of 1899-1902, both exploiter and explo-
ited confronted one another with wariness. Initially, the Boers retur-
ned to their farms in fear - particularly of the surrounding peasant-
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ry. Returning farm workers, meanwhile, were aware of the retributi-
on wreaked upon blacks caught aiding the British by Boer soldiers: su-
mmary execution was a common penalty. Some tenants who had aided the
British feared being "murdered in cold blood" and sought communal la-
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nds for themselves. Such murders do not appear to have occurred but
other vengeful acts were committed by the landlords. Tenants who had
engaged in intelligence work for the British - such as those led by
Jantjie Mosiaan in the Lichtenburg District - might be evicted. in
the Barberton District, tenants on the farm "Hermansberg" appear to
have had their rents radically raised by a landlord who sought to "te-
ach them a lesson" for having acted as "Scounts(sic) for the Briti-
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sh". Between 1899 and 1902, quite obviously, the class struggle had
intersected with the military conflict in the Transvaal. Now that con-
flict was over. The class struggle remained. But it could no longer
be waged by workers in the favourable conditions of the war years. The
imperial army, massed in the countryside, was now manifestly being us-
ed to intimidate a class other than the landlords'. Not surprisingly,
farm workers felt that they were being returned to their masters in a'
rather defenceless condition. Writing of many refugees, the Commander
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'-•:, . of Native Refugees stated; "Having- borne arms or taken an active part
in the War against their former employers they are afraid to return to
them."197
Subjected to the rule of their landlords, disillusioned in their
hopes for more land, rural workers nevertheless did achieve some gains
from the immense struggle against their exploiters in which they enga-
ged. Wages appear to have been driven up - in the Heidelburg District,
1 Q D
for example, they were a third higher than there pre-war figure.
The newly-won right not to return to an employer enabled some workers
199to avoid farms which had been sites of "bad treatment". Without
doubt, tenants became more assertive: their threats to leave landlords
enabled them to negotiate more favourable terms of tenancy in the nor-
thern and western districts of the Transvaal. Many tenants, moreover,
were able to convert their labour- into rent- tenancies: this was
"prevalent" in those zones of the Transvaal ceded to Natal; and in the
Pietersburg District, there were "many cases where" resisting labour
tenants were able to achieve a similar metamorphosis.
The advantage of such a conversion lay not so much in minimising
the degree of exploitation (which may have remained the same) as in
transforming its kind. The exploitation of the labour tenant was sec-
ured through the direct command of his or her labour by the landlord;
in the case of the rent tenant, it was secured through the periodical
extraction of products or their money-equivalent. The organisation of
production and the actual intensity of labour in the latter case rema-
ined under tenant control, although the need to secure a given rent,
tax and subsistence delimited certain boundaries in this regard.Rent-
unlike labour-, tenants had some measure of control over the labour
process through which they were exploited. Within the tenant family,
there was a patriarchal command of female and child labour and the
head of an extended family might himself not engage in labour at all:
but the oppressions within such a community were far fewer that those
within the landlord's economy and would have been mitigated by family
t i es.
The conversion of labour- into rent-tenancies, the ability to ne-
gotiate more favourable terms of tenancy, the driving up of wages -
all these were gains for rural working people; at the same time they
were symptomatic of the weakened landlords' need to make concessions
in order to regain the services of people, many of whom had - shortly
before - been fighting for a world without them. For the 'balance of
class forces' to be tilted once more decisively in the landowners'
favour, not a little compromise was needed.
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There was, however, one zone of the Transvaal where the Problems
of restoring the landlords were to prove particularly intractable: th-
ose westerly regions occupied by the Kgatla tenantry. In the Pilansbe-
rg, in fact, the effects of the Kgatla expropriation of the Boers was
to be felt for decades. Hundreds of Boer landownina families "departed
the area for all time,, and many of their farms stood vacant'* (of land-
lords?) "and unsold for twenty years." It was only after World War I
that the "second Boer colonization of the Transvaal north of Rusten-
burg got underway." For two decades, Kgatla herds could craze on eith-
er side of. the Marico and Crocodile Rivers and. in Soulspoort, much
private property was converted to communal use.
The reasons for the Kgatla success are not hard to seek. These
people were not simply isolated tenants throwing off the yoke of their
landlords spontaneously. They were the principal constituent of a lar-
ger community (of 30 000) led by Linchwe. Originally located at Saul-
spoort in the western Transvaal, the Kgatla peasantry was - in the
mid-nineteenth century - dispossessed of its land and subjected to the
rule of Boer landlords under harsh terms of tenancy. The result was
the flight of a significant minority to Bechuanaland where they estab-
lished a 'reserve* recognised by the British. The tenants left behind
in the Transvaal increasingly looked upon the leader of their more in-
dependent kinspeople across the border as "their only hope of easing,
if not escaping Boer rule." With this consciousness of dispossession,
this hankering after a relatively more autonomous peasant existence,
with the proximity of this tenantry to the redoubt in Bechuanaland
from which peasant regiments could be sent, it is not surprising that
at "the outbreak of war the brittle relationship between landlord and
tenant in the Western Transvaal shattered." Within a year, the Kgatla
had driven the landowning class off the farms on which it was the ten-
antry, not least by engendering in Boer families "the fear that regim-
ents from across the Bechuanaland frontier might come to 'liberate*
their people."
The struggle of the Kgatla tenantry was both revolutionary and
backward-looking: revolutionary, because its objective was the "recl-
aiming" of "ancestral land in the Transvaal" and the creation of a wo-
rld in which "the Boer" (i.e. the landlord) "ceased" "to farm or reign
supreme" ; backward-looking, because it sought to restore that which
was lost - a communal existence which itself had its oppressions (of
youth and women in production, for example). The world they would have
re-created in the western Transvaal if left to do so can be glimpsed
in Isaac Schapera's classic anthropological works on the Kgatla. In
Bechuanaland, where their communal lands were to remain intact and wh-
ere they refused to recognise capitalist private property amongst
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themselves (. irt 1943, the-sale of a. hut amongst them was described as
"rare" and rent unknown) , their differential access to cultivated land
was marked.. In a sample study- of 133 families, Schapera found the fol-
lowing1:
of families Amount of cultivated
land to which they had*
access
1" « • 0-10 acres
2
- *Z? 1 1 - 2 0 acres3
- I*'5 21 " 3° acres
_
4
* ^J - 3 1 - 4 0 acres
5
* ?* 41-50 acres
6
-
 2
^ 51+ acres
If, as one historian argues, the Kgatla in the Transvaal, sought a
"social revolution", it was not one which would have constituted a de-
cisive break towards a new society.
1 2. Conclusion,
The refraction of the preceding analysis through the theoretical con-
siderations with which this study opened suggests the following. The
onset of war in the Transvaal in 1899 was not marked - amongst the
vast majority of agrarian working people - by a wave of patriotism
that temporarily submerged class antagonisms: the fact that those peo-
ple were the victims of colonial conquest and dispossession cancelled
any chance of this. There are examples of blacks (some of them servan-
ts) aiding the Boers but these were neither historically typical or
significant : had they been, the British would not have had" to fash-
ion and implenent their elaborate programme to restore the class rule
of the landlords.
 }The immense intervention of the British Army, which
so dislocated the society of the landlords, enabled rural workers to
transform class struggle into class war. It was the British Army and
the rural working:classes which expropriated the Boer.landlords during
the South African War.
This class war - sheathed within the Boer-British conflict - hel-
ps to account for certain features of Boer strategy such as the send-
ing of a "strong force under Commandant Klaas Prinsloo" to the heart-
land of the Pedi peasantry so as to guarantee the security of "the wh-
ite farming community in Lydenburg district".207 Moreover, the large-
scale massacre(during the war) of blacks caught aiding the British ap-
pears to have been the action of a class fearing extinction208, a cla-
ss (as. Smuts wrote of the Boers) fearing "an eventual debacle of soci-
ty". Indeed, the socio-neurotic fears of the 'landlords-in-arms' conv-
eyed this. One of their commanders wrote of "armed native and colour-
-39-
ed boys" traversing the Boer Republics seeking- "to pay off old scor-
es", of armed "coloured servants" boasting- that they would possess the
209farms of Cape Boers and marry their wives. These fears did. not
drop, as it were, from the sky. They grew, cjuite literally, out of the
ground - site of the agrarian class war of 1899-1902. The Boers fjear-
ed because they had much to fear. The workers' struggle against them
had sometimes been carried 'to the very point of physical exterminati-
on: around Orighstad, in the eastern Transvaal, there appears to have
been a particularly ruthless campaign against the landowners with farm
workers sallying forth in the darkness to "murder- and plunder".
But once the defeat of the Boers had been secured, the British -
for the reasons discussed - disarmed rural workers, reversed their ex-
propriationary drive and restored the social and material existence of
the landowing class. The character of the invading force, then, was
crucial to the outcome of the class struggles of 1899-1902: that it
was the imperial army of a bourgeois state decided that it would int-
ervene (ultimately) to restore private property. This latter point may
be stressed by analogy: in 1945, in Eastern Germany, the fact that the
Red Army was. the occupying force was decisive for ensuring "the expro-
priation of the Prussian Junkers, the landlord class" "with whom the
German Left had wrestled unsuccessfully for over a century."
For agrarian workers, then, the class war of 1899-1902 ultimately
failed in it objectives, although the landlords emerged weaker and sh-
aken from their ordeal. The .reasons for this failure are three-fold.
First, and most obviously, the brute fact of the British intervention.
Second, and less importantly, the nature of Transvaal peasant societ-
ies whose structures of power and authority appear to have undermined
effective resistance. It was no accident that the British bribed the
village elders with gun-licenses to spur them into encouraging their
followers to surrender their arms: the NCs were clear about the
positive role the chiefs played in this and when they encountered, in
the Waterburg District, peasants who appeared to have retained their
weaponry, they considered that their chief (Zebedela) had departed fr-
om the norm: "had he exerted the proper influence of a Chief, the tak-
212ing of arms in his Location would have been more than doubled."
Once the policy of Wt0 restoring the landowners became evident, resis-
ting it effectively would have entailed - at the very least - a viol-
ent and. protracted confrontation with the British. Such a confronta-
tion could only be directed by a leadership rooted in the poorer sect-
ions of the agrarian working class - i.e those with least to lose and
most to gain. The chiefs, with their assured privileges within their
own communities, had most to lose in such a confrontation: the logic
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of their own position dictated their recoiling from such a prospect.
They themselves were already imbricated in the increasingly-capitalist
exploitation of thetr people. Stanley Trapido has suggestively ar-
gued that one of the reasons foe the rapid re-establishment of the
rural order in the Transvaal after the waf" was the re-introduction of
labour-recruiting which made "chiefs more willing to collaborate once
21 3
more". In fact, in at least one case, a chief set about such a ru-
thless exploitation of young men (by incessantly indenturing them to
labour recruiters who paid him fees) that he appears, in effect, to
21 4have lost his following and been deposed. Nevertheless, it would
be an error to over-stress the exploitation within peasant societies
in regard to some of the important concerns of this study: quite-obvi-
ously, for example, the interests of the entire peasant .community - a
community profoundly conditioned by communal property - could coincide
in an attack upon landlords which would increase the land and livesto-
to which the community would have access (even if some members of the
community were to enjoy more favourable access than others).
Third, rural workers were unable to ensure a final expropriation
of their exploiters because their struggle was overwhelmingly uncoord-
inated and spontaneous in nature. The militant Kgatla tenants in the
western Transvaal were not interested in struggles beyond the Pilans-
berg; and there is evidence of conflicts between peasant communities
themselves during these years, for example over livestock. This spon-
taneity and lack of coordination rendered agrarian workers unable to
vault over the two conditions of their failure mentioned above. It is
a commonplace - but a truism - that the underclasses lacked revoltion-
ary organisation and strategy. Only these would have given rural work-
ers - whether on farms or on communal lands - the weapons with which
to continue fighting for a world without landlords. That world they
temporarily achieved, but often simply by following in the direction
that their alienation and spontaneous acts of resistance led them.
They could not hold on to that world, or prevent its retreat, without
an idea of a new society and the organisation requisite to materialise
that idea.
It is here that a comparison with the history of the Vietnamese
peasantry is most instructive. For, in Vietnam too, war and class str-
ggle powerfully combined. The German defeat of France (the colonial
power in Indochina) in 1940 and the Japanese occupation of Vietnam
were crucial for the advance of the revolutionary movement there. Once
French rule was restored in Vietnam after World War Two, attempts to
disarm the peasantpguerrillas and liquidate their desire for a new so-
ciety (also without landowners) proved impossible. Forces - far
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more massive than those mustered in the Transvaal in 1902 - attempted
the task, climaxing in the final futility of the American assault upon
South-East Asia. What made the Vietnamese Revolution possible, writes
Benedict Anderson, "was 'planning revolution1" - a project itself de-
pendent upon the anterior historical experience of the Russian, and Ch-
inese Revolutions upon which the Vietnamese drew.215 It was this that
was missing in the Transvaal at the turn of the century.
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